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Joint Custody As A Parenting
Alternative
JUDGE BILLY G. MILLS*
STEVEN P. BELZER**
Joint custody of children has been a recently accepted alternative to the
traditional child custody/visitation orders that usually follow dissolution
proceedings. In 1980, California became one of the first states to provide,
by statute, a presumption in favor of an award of joint custody to the
parents.
The authors present the legislative history of this joint custody statute
and synthesize the various views that have been expressed on the subject
of joint custody. Also presented is a discussion of the legislative intent be-
hind the statute and whether the current law is the most effective means of
protecting the best interests of the child and of assuring minor children of
frequent and continuing contact with both parents after a marital
dissolution.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the opening of the 1979-1980 session of the California Legisla-
ture, representatives of various groups of divorced fathers began
to press for the introduction of a bill which would enable fathers
Supervising Judge of Family Law Developments, Central District, Los An-
geles County Superior Court.
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of Justice. Draftsman of Senate Bill 477 and of Assembly Bill 1480, as enacted.
The authors express their appreciation to Shary Klamer, a third-year student at
Whittier College of Law, for her valuable research assistance.
to share the responsibilities of child rearing and to gain greater
access to their children. These representatives believed that the
traditional child custody-visitation orders being rendered by Cali-
fornia Superior Courts ignored the desire of many fathers to take
an active part in the rearing of their children.
A number of scholarly articles have discussed the divorced par-
ent's physical custody. These articles have also considered the le-
gal rights which the custodial parent enjoys with regard to the
education, religious training, lifestyle, medical and dental care,
and other aspects of their children's lives.' There has been con-
siderable controversy among commentators as to the possible
benefits and detriments of what has come to be called "joint cus-
tody." On the one hand, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit 2 :recom-
mended that custody orders virtually eliminate any direct
participation in child rearing by the noncustodial parent and,
therefore, provide the child with a sense of stability due to the
minimal amount of state intrusion into the life of the family.
Others, such as Roman and Haddad,3 have posited that joint cus-
tody should be considered by courts as the best form of custody
order in most, if not at all, cases. Roman and Haddad have ar-
gued that joint custody provides the child with a meaningful rela-
tionship with both parents, outweighing the potential damage that
may be inflicted upon the child by being subjected to parental
conflict.4 Still other commentators have fallen somewhere be-
tween these two extremes.5
Proponents of joint custody or "cooperative parenting," believe
that it avoids the situation of th6 overburdened mother and the
under-involved father by providing both parents with a definite
role, a sense of involvement, and an opportunity to share respon-
sibilities. Additionally, they favor joint custody because it offers
legal protection for voluntary cooperative parenting and an oppor-
tunity for family self-determination.
In California, the issue of joint custody was complicated by
both the language of the Family Law Act 6 and disagreements
1. See, e.g., Foster & Freed, Joint Custody-A Viable Alternative, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 9, 1978, at 1 and Nov. 24, 1978, at 1.
2. J. GOLDSTEmN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILI (1979).
3. M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT (1979); Roman, The Dis-
posable Parent, 15 CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 1 (1977).
4. Benedek & Benedek, Post Divorce Visitation: A Child's Right, 16 AM.
ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY J. 256, 260 (1977).
5. For an extensive listing of commentaries on the subject, see Folberg & Gra-
ham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 523, 523-24 nn.
2-6 (1979).
6. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-7028 (West 1970) (amended 1979). California Civil
Code § 4600, as enacted, provided that custody of a minor child at issue in a pro-
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among courts as to whether the Act authorized entering orders
for shared custody.7 The time was right and the stage was then
set for the California Legislature to reconsider the question of
joint custody.8 What followed was the introduction of two bills
with conflicting provisions. On March 1, 1979, Senate Bill 477
(hereinafter SB 477) was introduced by Senator Jerry Smith, and
on March 29, 1979, Assemblyman Charles Imbrecht introduced As-
sembly Bill 1480 (hereinafter AB 1480). Both bills were eventu-
ally enacted in significantly modified form and ultimately AB
1480 became effective.
As of January 1, 1980, California became one of the first states
to provide, by statute, a presumption in favor of an award of joint
custody.9 Support to amend the original statute in favor of the
presumption came from a variety of groups: fathers who felt that
their rights were being violated by judicial predisposition to
award custody to mothers; legal and mental health professionals
who felt that joint custody should be clearly available in appropri-
ate post-dissolution situations; parents who had defacto coopera-
tive parenting arrangements and wanted court approval; and
various attorneys and judges experienced in the family law field.
Although there have been a variety of opinions expressed on
the subject, joint custody is a new legal concept, and its actual ef-
fectiveness has not been substantially proved. Therefore, any
ceeding under the Family Law Act, should be awarded in the following order of
preference:
. (a) To either parent according to the best interests of the child, but,
other things being equal, custody shall be given to the mother if the child
is of tender years.
. (b) To the person or persons in whose home the child has been living
in a wholesome and stable environment.
(c) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable
and able to provide adequate and proper care and guidance for the child.
7. The various permutations of what is perceived to be joint custody, as op-
posed to divided custody, are discussed in In re Marriage of Neal, 92 Cal. App. 3d
834, 155 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1979). In addition, joint custody awards were approved
under former California Civil Code § 138 (repealed upon enactment of the Family
Law Act) in Rocha v. Rocha, 123 Cal. App. 2d 28, 266 P.2d 130 (1954) (custody of
two infant sons to the mother, except for two 15 day periods during the year when
custody was awarded to the father); Fahnestock v. Fahnestock, 76 Cal. App. 2d 817,
174 P.2d 660 (1946) (custody of a 17-year-old son to the mother and the father).
8. Another joint custody bill, Assembly Bill 3475, was introduced in 1976 by
then Assemblyman Ken Maddy. That bill passed the Assembly, but was held in
the Senate Judiciary Committee.
-9. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 107.105 (1977); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 2437.24 (West
Cum. Supp. 1978-79).
conclusion at this time is most probably premature. Social and
political pressures, rather than empirical research, appear to have
been the main impetus behind the joint custody movement.
This article will present the legislative history of the joint cus-
tody statute and a synthesis of the various views that have been
expressed on the subject of joint custody. Additionally, the arti-
cle will present a discussion of the legislative intent behind the
statute and whether the current law is the most effective means
of protecting the best interests of the child and assuring minor
children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents af-
ter a marital dissolution.
II. LEGISLATVE HISTORY
A. Senate Bill 477
Senate Bill 477, as introduced on March 1, 1979,10 proposed the
addition of section 4600.5 to the California Civil Code. In its origi-
nal form, the bill provided that joint custody would be presumed
to be in the best interests of the child if certain conditions ex-
isted. First, the parties to the custody proceeding must have
agreed to an award of joint custody. Second, the parties must
10. As introduced, the bill reads:
4600.5. (a) Joint custody shall be presumed to be in the best interests of
the child where all of the following factors are present:
(1) The parties have agreed in writing to an award of joint custody
or so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the
custody of the minor children of the marriage.
(2) The parties have submitted to the court for its approval, a writ-
ten plan for the implementation of the joint custody arrangement.
(3) Both parties presently reside in this state and state that they in-
tend to reside in this state in the future. Such presumption is a presump-
tion affecting the burden of proof.
(b) Joint custody may be awarded in other cases but in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence shall not be presumed to be in the best in-
terests of the child. For the purpose of assisting the court in making a de-
termination as to an award of joint custody, the court may direct that an
investigation be conducted pursuant to the provisions of section 4602.
(c) For the purposes of this section, "joint custody" means an arrange-
ment whereby the minor child or children of the parents shall be in the
physical custody of each parent for a period of time with the parents hav-
ing equal control of the care, upbringing and education of the child or chil-
dren.
(d) Any order for joint custody shall be terminated by the court if one
parent establishes his or her principal residence in another state. Any
such order may be modified or terminated upon the petition of one or both
parents or the court's own motion if it is shown that the best interests of
the child require modification or termination of the order. The court may
consider evidence of any substantial failure of a parent to adhere to the
plan for implementation of the joint custody arrangement in determining
whether the joint custody order shall be modified or terminated.
S. 477, 1979-80 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., Senate Daily Journal 700 (March 1, 1979).
[Vol. 9: 853, 19821 Joint Custody
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have submitted an implementation plan for the court's approval.
Third, both parties were required to reside in California.
Under SB 477, joint custody awards were authorized in cases
where the conditions did not exist, but joint custody was not pre-
sumed to be in the best interests of the child absent clear and
convincing evidence to that effect. A joint custody order could be
modified or terminated upon a showing that a parent had sub-
stantially failed to adhere to the approved plan, or upon one par-
ent establishing residence outside of California.
On the date of introduction, the author, Senator Jerry Smith, is-
sued a press release in which the purpose of SB 477 was de-
scribed as conferring benefits on both parent and child.1 It was
clear from the initial form of SB 477 that the language of Civil
Code section 4600 was considered adequate to make joint custody
a possibility under its terms. However, after circulating SB 477
for comment, several problems were noted.
On April 16, 1979, prior to hearing in committee, SB 477 was
amended in several significant respects.1 2 In order for section
11. Senator Smith was quoted in the press release as saying, 'This bill would
be of benefit to both the parents and the children. It would eliminate the inequity
under our divorce law which usually results in custody being awarded to the
mother, and, at the same time, would give each parent an equal chance to partici-
pate in raising the children. The children would benefit because they would con-
tinue to have equal access to both parents."
12. The amended version of the bill was proposed to read:
4600.5. (a) There shall be a presumption, affecting the burden of proof,
that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child where all the
following factors are present:
(1) The parents have agreed in writing to an award of joint custody
or so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the
custody of the minor child or children of the marriage.
(2) If the wishes of the child have been consulted under the circum-
stances stated in section 4600, the child agrees to joint custody.
(3) The parents have submitted to the court for its approval, a writ-
ten plan for the implementation of the joint custody award, including pro-
visions for minimizing substantial disruption of the child's schooling,
daily routine, association with friends, and religious training.
(b) Joint custody may be awarded in the discretion of the court in
other cases. For the purpose of assisting the court in making a determina-
tion whether an award of joint custody is appropriate under this subdivi-
sion, the court may direct that an investigation be conducted pursuant to
the provisions of Section 4602.
(c) For the purposes of this section, "joint custody" means an order
awarding custody of the minor child or children to both parents and pro-
viding that physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way
as to assure the child or children of close and continuing contact with both
parents.
(d) Any order for joint custody may be modified or terminated upon
4600.5, as proposed by SB 477, to work in conjunction with the ex-
isting section 4600 of the Civil Code, SB 477 had to amend section
4600(a)'s preference for awarding custody to either parent.13 Fur-
ther, the conditions for application of the presumption favoring
joint custody were significantly modified. The first modification
was an addition that the wishes of the child be consulted where
the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent
preference as to custody, and that the child agree to joint cus-
tody.14 Secondly, the implementation plan provision was modi-
fied to make more explicit what was required in the plan to
minimize disruption of the child's usual routine, education, as-
sociations, and religious training.' 5 Thirdly, the provision barring
joint custody where one parent lived out of state was elimi-
nated.1 6 Finally, the clear and convincing evidence standard re-
quired to activate the presumption in cases lacking the requisite
conditions was removed.' 7
One of the more important revisions made was the addition of a
retroactivity clause.18 Another provision was added concerning
the services of the conciliation courts. In counties having one, SB
the petition of one or both parents or on the court's own motion if it is
shown that the best interests of the child require modification or termina-
tion of the order. The court may consider, among other factors, evidence of
any substantial or repeated failure of a parent to adhere to the plan for
implementing the joint custody order or evidence that one parent has es-
tablished, or is likely to establish his or her principal residence in another
state in determining whether the order should be modified or terminated.
(e) Any order for the custody of the minor child or children of a mar-
riage entered by a court in this state or any other state may be modified at
any time to an order of joint custody in accordance with the provisions of
this section.
(.") ' In counties having a conciliation court, the court of the parties may,
at any time, consult with the conciliation court for the purpose of assisting
the parties to formulate a plan for implementation of the joint custody or-
der or to resolve any controversy which has arisen in the implementation
of a plan for joint custody previously approved by the court.
SEC. 3. The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of
this state to assure minor children of close and continuing contact with
both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage.
The Legislature further finds and declares that it is the public policy of this
state that there exists no preference in law that the custody of minor chil-
dren be ordered or awarded to one parent because of that parent's gender.
S. 477 1979-80 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., Senate Daily Journal 1814-17 (April 16, 1979)
(emphasis in original).
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1970). Under the amended version of S. 477,
§ 4600(a) of the California Civil Code would be modified to read: "(a) To either
parent, or to both parents jointly, pursuant to section 4600.5, according to the best
interests of the child."
14. S. 477 § 2(a) (2), 1979-80 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., Senate Daily Journal 1815 (as
amended April 16, 1979).
15. Id. § 2(a)(3), Senate Daily Journal 1815-16.
16. Id.
17. Id. § 2(b), Senate Daily Journal 1816.
18. Id. § 2(e).
[Vol. 9: 853, 1982] Joint Custody
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477 extended the services of these courts to parents for purposes
of assisting in formulating joint custody plans and in resolving im-
plementation problems which might later arise.19
A statement of public policy was added at the end of SB 477,
making two distinct findings. The first finding was reflected in the
original version of the bill and stipulated that children of divorce
should be assured close and continuing contact with both parents
after separation or dissolution of marriage. The second was a new
statement reaffirming the requirement of law that neither parent
should be preferred as custodian based upon the parent's sex.20
While the original bill had defined "joint custody," the definition
was too general.2 1 As a result, the amended version of SB 477 at-
tempted to arrive at a workable definition of the term.
Senate Bill 477 was heard in the Senate Judiciary Committee in
this form, and was voted out to the senate floor with a "do pass"
recommendation. 22 Witnesses who testified at the committee
hearing suggested additional amendments to the bill which were
accepted by the author. These amendments were incorporated
into SB 477 on April 24, 1979, and on May 3, SB 477 was passed by
the senate without a dissenting vote.23 Senate Bill 477 included a
group of amendments which had been suggested at the Judiciary
Committee hearing.24
By the time SB 477 passed out of its house of origin, the relative
simplicity of its underlying idea had been consumed in
hypertechnical requirements tied to a joint custody award. This
became a serious problem with SB 477. Ultimately, the objective
of maintaining parent-child relationships after separation and dis-
19. Id. § 2(f), Senate Daily Journal 1816-17.
20. Id. at § 3, Senate Daily Journal 1817.
21. S. 477 § 2(c) 1979-80 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess., Senate Daily Journal 1816 (as
amended April 16, 1979).
22. Senate Daily Journal 1918 (April 23, 1979).
23. The amendments incorporated in the April 24, 1979 version of Senate Bill
477 brought the portion of the legislative policy statement barring sex-based cus-
tody awards into the text of Civil Code § 4600(a); eliminated the requirement that
the child, if consulted, agree to the order, (see CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(a) (2) (West
Supp. 1981), made more explicit the provisions which may be included in the im-
plementation plan and required a judge who declined to order joint custody when
the presumption applied, to state in the order his reasons for denial, made awards
in other cases available only upon request of either party, and made the retroac-
tivity provisions subject to the jurisdictional requirements of California Civil Code
§ 5152 a part of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
24. Senate Daily Journal 2763 (May 3, 1979).
solution of the marriage was obscured by the vehicle proposed to
accomplish that objective.
Senate Bill 477 underwent substantial changes before its hear-
ing in the Assembly Committee on Judiciary. On June 4, 1979, the
final set of substantive amendments was made. 25 Those amend-
ments eliminated excess verbiage in section 4600.5(a), eliminated
the need for written agreement by the parties, made the require-
ment for an implementation plan discretionary, added a proviso
that joint legal custody could be awarded without awarding joint
physical custody, and eliminated the enumeration of the kinds of
evidence which a court could consider in modifying or terminat-
ing a joint custody order.26 In this final amended form, SB 477
was referred out of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary on
June 11, 1979, with a unanimous "do pass" recommendation. On
June 14, 1979, the bill passed the Assembly without a dissenting
vote.27 The senate, again without dissent, concurred in the assem-
bly amendments on June 20, and sent the bill to the Governor's
desk.28 On July 3, 1979, California had its first joint custody law. 29
25. These amendments were drafted into the bill in part as an accommodation
to requests by so-called fathers' rights groups who opposed the bill but wished to
have it amended to more closely resemble Assembly Bill 1480, which they sup-
ported. One such group, Equal Rights for Fathers, employed a contract lobbyist
who suggested and advocated some of the amendments incorporated into the bill
and others which were not acceptable to the author.
26. Probably the most controversial amendment was the addition of the pro-
viso at the end of § 4600.5(a). It has also become one of the greatest stumbling
blocks of joint custody legislation because the term "legal custody" is not defined.
For a discussion of what it might be, see In re Marriage of Neal, 92 Cal. App. 3d 834,
155 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1979).
27. Assembly Daily Journal 6654 (June 14, 1979). It is interesting to note that
before adoption by the Assembly, Senate Bill 477 was again amended. In a re-
freshing display of legislative efficiency, the amendment, requiring full reprinting
of the bill, changed a comma to a semicolon.
28. Senate Daily Journal 4790 (June 20, 1979).
29. 1979 Cal. Stat. 683 sets out the final text of Senate Bill 477:
SECTION 1. Section 4600 of the Civil Code is amended to read:
4600. In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor
child, the court may, during the pendency of the proceeding, or at any
time thereafter, make such order for the custody of such child during his
minority as may seem necessary or proper. If a child is of sufficient age
and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to cus-
tody, the court shall consider and give due weight to his wishes in making
an award of custody or modification thereof. Custody should be awarded
in the following order of preference:
(a) To either parent, or to both parents jointly pursuant to section
4600.5, according to the best interests of the child, provided, however, that
in making such an award to either parent, the court shall not prefer a par-
ent as custodian because of that parent's sex.
(b) To the person or persons in whose home the child has been living
in a wholesome and stable environment.
(c) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable
and able to provide adequate and proper care and guidance for the child.
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or per-
[Vol. 9: 853, 1982] Joint Custody
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B. Assembly Bill 148030
At the request of a constituent, Assemblyman Charles Im-
sons other than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall make
a finding that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the
child and the award to a nonparent is required to serve the best interests
of the child. Allegations that parental custody would be detrimental to the
child, other than a statement of that ultimate fact, shall not appear in the
pleadings. The court may, in its discretion, exclude the public from the
hearing on this issue.
SECTION 2. Section 4600.5 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
4600.5. (a) There shall be a presumption affecting the burden of proof,
that joint custody is in the best interest of a minor child where the par-
ents have agreed to an award of joint custody or so agree in open court at
a hearing for the purpose of determining the custody of the minor child or
children of the marriage.
The court in its discretion, may require the parents to submit to the
court a plan for the implementation of the joint custody order. If the court
declines to enter an order awarding joint custody pursuant to subdivision
(a), the court shall state in its order the reasons for denial of an award of
joint custody.
(b) Upon the application of either parent, joint custody may be
awarded in the discretion of the court in other cases. For the purpose of
assisting the court in making a determination whether an award of joint
custody is appropriate under this subdivision, the court shall, upon the re-
quest of either party, direct that an investigation be conducted pursuant
to the provisions of section 4602.
(c) For the purposes of this section, "joint custody" means an order
awarding legal custody of the minor child or children to both parents and
providing that physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a
way as to assure the child or children of continuing contact with both par-
ents; provided, however, that such order may award joint legal custody
without awarding joint physical custody.
(d) Any order for joint custody may be modified or terminated upon
the petition of one or both parents or on the court's own motion if it is
shown that the best interests of the child required modification or termi-
nation of the order.
(e) Any order for the custody of the minor child or children of a mar-
riage entered by a court in this state or any other state may, subject to the
jurisdictional requirements set forth in sections 5152 and 5163, be modified
at any time to an order of joint custody in accordance with the provisions
of this section.
(f) In counties having a conciliation court, the court or the parties
may, at any time, pursuant to local rules of court, consult with the concili-
ation court for the purpose of assisting the parties to formulate a plan for
implementation of the joint custody order or to resolve any controversy
which has arisen in the implementation of a plan for joint custody.
SECTION 3. The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public
policy of this state to assure minor children of close and continuing con-
tact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their
marriage. The Legislature further finds and declares that it is the public
policy of this state that there exist no preference in law that the custody
of minor children be ordered or awarded to one parent because of that
parent's sex. 1979 Cal. Stat. 683.
30. See AB 1480, 1979-80 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1979) (as amended May 14,
1979).
brecht 31 introduced Assembly Bill (AB) 1480 on March 29, 1979.
Assembly Bill 1480 amended California Civil Code section 4600 to
alter the order of preference in which child custody would be
awarded. The bi1132 set forth a new order of preference: joint
physical and legal custody was given first preference; sole custody
was given second preference, upon a showing that sole custody is
in the best interests of the child; and custody to other suitable
persons was given third preference. Eliminating the former sec-
ond preference for the award of child custody to the person in
whose home the child had been living, AB 1480 also contained a
statement of legislative intent that children of divorced parents be
assured of having equal access to both parents whenever
possible.
Assembly Bill 1480 was heard in the Assembly Committee on
Judiciary on May 9, 1979.33 At that hearing, amendments were
suggested to the author. It being apparent that there were not
sufficient votes on the committee to move the bill out in its origi-
nal form, the author accepted the amendments. On May 14, 1979,
the first preference was amended to provide for "joint physical
and legal custody" or "joint legal custody with physical custody
awarded to one parent. '34
31. Assemblyman Art Torres joined as coauthor.
32. As introduced, AB 1480 reads:
SECTION 1. It is the intention of the Legislature by this act to insure
that, to the extent possible, despite dissolution of the marriage of a child's
parents, the child shall have equal access to both parents.
SECTION 2. Section 4600 of the Civil Code is amended to read:
4600. In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor
child, the court may, during the pendency of the proceeding or at any time
thereafter, make such order for the custody of such child during his mi-
nority as may seem necessary or proper. If a child is of sufficient age and
capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody,
the court shall consider and give due weight to his wishes in making an
award of custody or modification thereof. Custody should be awarded in
the following order of preference:
(a) To both parents in joint physical and legal custody.
(b) To either parent if a preponderance of the evidence established that
it is in the best interest of the child that custody should be awarded to one
parent or if the parents agree that one parent shall assume custody.
(c) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable
and able to provide adequate and proper care and guidance for the child.
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or per-
sons other than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall make
a finding that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the
child and the award to a nonparent is required to serve the best interests
of the child. Allegations that parental custody would be detrimental to the
child, other than a statement of that ultimate fact, shall not appear in the
pleadings. The court may, in its discretion exclude the public from the
hearing on this issue. A.B. 1480, 1979-80 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., Assembly
Daily Journal 1480 (March 29, 1979) (emphasis in original).
33. It should be noted that SB 477 had already passed the senate and was in
the assembly, assigned for hearing to the Judiciary Committee.
34. AB 1480, as amended May 14, 1979, added the phrase "according to the best
[Vol. 9: 853, 1982] Joint Custody
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With this amendment, AB 1480 was referred out of committee
with a "do pass" recommendation on May 17, 1979.35 The assem-
bly passed the bill unanimously on May 25, 1979.36 Assembly Bill
1480 came before the Senate Judiciary Committee on August 28,
1979,37 and it became immediately apparent that AB 1480 would
encounter some difficulty in the Committee.38
Prior to the hearing, a number of amendments to AB 1480 were
discussed by Senator Smith, Mr. Imbrecht, and their respective
staff members. These discussions resulted in agreement that the
bill would be amended to a form substantially the same as SB
477, with some additional amendments. On August 28, 1979, AB
1480 was amended in committee, 39 and was referred out with a
"do pass" recommendation on a unanimous vote. Senator Smith
became the principal coauthor of the bill and carried it to the
senate floor.40 On September 5, 1979, AB 1480 was passed by the.
senate without a dissenting vote4 ' and was returned to the assem-
bly for concurrence in amendments, again on the consent calen-
interest of the child" at the end of the introductory portion of section 4600 and ad-
ded subsection (a) to provide: (a) To both parents in joint physical and legal
custody or to both parents in joint legal custody with physical custody awarded to
one parent. Assembly Daily Journal 4731 (May 14, 1979).
35. The vote was not recorded in the Assembly Journal; however, the author
recalls that it was unanimous in the Committee. The amendments also resulted in
the addition of nine assembly coauthors and three senate coauthors. Pursuant to
Joint Rules 22.1, 22.2, and 22.3, the Committee recommended that the bill be placed
on the consent calendar of the Assembly File. AB 1480, 1979-80 Cal. Leg., Reg.
Sess., Assembly Daily Journal 4970-71 (May 17, 1979). This procedure has the ef-
fect of submitting the bill to a pro forma vote on the floor of the assembly without
debate.
36. Assembly Daily Journal 5492 (May 25, 1979).
37. The Senate Judiciary Committee was chaired at the time by Senator
Smith, the author of SB 477. It should be noted that SB 477 had already been
signed into law by the Governor.
38. By August.28, 1979, formal opposition to the bill in its amended form had
been lodged by the Family Law Section of the State Bar of California, the Califor-
nia Judges Association, the Executive Committee of the Santa Clara County Bar
Association Family Law Section, the Northern California Chapter of the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, and some individual superior court judges.
39. The final amended version of the bill was somewhat confused because of
the pendency of Assembly Bill 167, a Law Revision Commission Bill dealing with
guardianship and conservatorship. Because of conflicting provisions between ver-
sions of CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600, AB 167 and AB 1480 were "double joined." Double
joining is a process by which conflicting bills are harmonized by providing which
version of an amendment will be effective in the event both bills are enacted and
approved by the Governor.
40. In his floor statement, Senator Smith described the bill as a supplement to
SB 477.
41. Senate Daily Journal 7163 (September 5, 1979).
dar. Assembly Bill 1480 was passed by the assembly on
September 10, 1979,42 and signed into law on September 21, 1979.43
In its final form, AB 1480 brought the legislative policy state-
42. Assembly Daily Journal 9505 (September 10, 1979).
43. For the final version of AB 1480, See 1979 Cal. Stat. 3479.
SECTION 1. Section 4600 of the Civil Code is amended to read: The
Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to
assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both par-
ents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage, and in
order to effect such policy, it is necessary to encourage parents to share
the rights and responsibilities of child rearing.
In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor child,
the court may, during the pendency of the proceeding or at any time
thereafter, make such order for the custody of the child during minority as
may seem necessary or proper. If a child is of sufficient age and capacity
to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody, the court
shall consider and give due weight to the wishes of the child in making an
award of custody or modification thereof. Custody should be awarded in
the following order of preference, according to the best interests of the
child:
(a) To both parents jointly pursuant to section 4600.5 or to either par-
ent. In making an award of custody to either parent, the court shall con-
sider which parent is more likely to allow the child or children frequent
and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent, and shall not prefer
a parent as custodian because of that parent's sex.
The court, in its discretion, may require the parents to submit to the
court a plan for the implementation of the custody order.
(b) If to neither parent, to the "person or persons in whose home the
child has been living in a wholesome and stable environment."
(c) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable
and abl6 to provide adequate and proper care and guidance for the child.
. Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or per-
sons other than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall make
a finding that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the
child and the award to a nonparent is required to serve the best interests
of the child. Allegations that parental custody would be detrimental to the
child, other'than a statement of that ultimate fact, shall not appear in the
pleadings. The court may, in its discretion, exclude the public from the
hearings on this issue.
SECTION 2. Section 4600.5 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
4600.5. (a) There shall be a presumption affecting the burden of proof,
that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child where the par-
ents have agreed to an award of joint custody or so agree in open court at
a hearing for the purpose of determining the custody of the minor child or
children of the marriage.
If the court declines to enter an order awarding joint custody pursuant
to this subdivision the court shall state in its decision the reasons for de-
nial of an award of joint custody.
(b) Upon the application of either parent, joint custody may be
awarded in the discretion of the court in other cases. For the purpose of
assisting the court in making a determination whether an award of joint
custody is appropriate under this subdivision, the court may direct that an
investigation be conducted pursuant to the provisions of section 4602. If
the court declines to enter an order awarding joint custody pursuant to
this subdivision, the court shall state in its decision the reasons for denial
of an award of joint custody.
(c) For the purpose of this section, "joint custody" means an order
awarding custody of the minor child or children to both parents and pro-
viding that physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way
as to assure the child or children of frequent and continuing contact with
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both parents; provided, however, that such order may award joint legal
custody without awarding joint physical custody.
(d) Any order for joint custody may be modified or terminated upon
the petition of one or both parents or on the court's own motion if it is
shown that the best interests of the child require modification or termina-
tion of the order. The court shall state in its decision the reasons for mod-
ification or termination of the joint custody order if either parent opposes
the modification or termination order.
(e) Any order for the custody of the minor child or children of a mar-
riage entered by a court in this state or any other state may be subject to
the jurisdictional requirements set forth in Section 5152 and 5163, be modi-
fied at any time to an order of joint custody in accordance with the provi-
sions of this section.
(f) In counties having a conciliation court, the court or the parties
may, at any time, pursuant to local rules of court, consult with the concili-
ation court for the purpose of assisting the parties to formulate a plan for
implementation of the custody order or to resolve any controversy which
has arisen in the implementation of a plan for custody.
(g) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, access to records and
information pertaining to a minor child, including but not limited to medi-
cal, dental, and school records shall not be denied to a parent because
such parent is not the child's custodial parent.
SECTION 3. Section 4600 of the Civil Code is amended to read:
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of
this state to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with
both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage,
and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child
rearing in order to effect this policy. I
In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor child,
the court may, during the pendency of the proceeding or at any time
thereafter, make such order for the custody of the child during minority as
may seem necessary or proper. If a child is of sufficient age and capacity
to reason as to form an intelligent preference as to custody, the court shall
consider and give due weight to the wishes of the child in making an
award of custody or modification thereof. In determining the person or
persons to whom custody should be awarded under paragraph (2) or (3)
of subdivision (b), the court shall consider and give due weight to the
nomination of a guardian of the person of the child by a parent under Arti-
cle 1 (commencing with Section 1500) of Chapter 1 of Part 2 of Division 4
of the Probate Code.
(b) Custody should be awarded in the following order of preference
according to the best interests of the child:
(1) To both parents jointly pursuant to Section 4600.5 or to either par-
ent. In making an order for custody to either parent, the court shall con-
sider among other factors, which parent is more likely to allow the child or
children frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent,
and shall not prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent's sex.
The court in its discretion, may require the parents to submit to the court
a plan for the implementation of the custody order.
(2) If to neither parent, to the person or persons in whose home the
child has been living in a wholesome and stable environment.
(3) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable
and able to provide adequate and proper care and guidance for the child.
(c) Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or
persons other than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall
make a finding that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental
to the child and the award to a nonparent is required to serve the best in-
ment into the text of section 4600.44 It also required the court to
consider, among other factors, which parent is more likely to al-
low the noncustodial parent frequent and continuing contact,
where a sole custody order is made.45 In section 4600.5, AB 1480
makes a custody investigation discretionary rather than
mandatory when requested by a party.4 6 Other amendments re-
quire a judge denying,47 modifying, or terminating48 a joint cus-
tody order to state the reasons for the decision. Finally, a
provision was added affirming a noncustodial parent's right to ac-
cess to his or her child's records, including medical, dental and
school records.49
It is clear that the basic intent of both joint custody bills was to
provide a vehicle by which parents could share the upbringing of
their children. That intent was overshadowed by the panacea of
joint custody, and assumed a significance secondary to the formu-
lation of technical rules to achieve the goal.
A combination of heavy lobbying and unfortunate legislative
timing served to bring about a legally unsatisfactory solution to
an emotionally charged human problem. In a legal sense, the
final product lacked clarity. Neither bill adequately defined "le-
gal" or "physical" custody,5 0 and neither bill satisfied the wishes
of its proponents. The issue remains one of continuing legislative
interest.5 1
terests of the child. Allegations that parental custody would be detrimen-
tal to the child, other than a statement of that ultimate fact, shall not
appear in the pleadings. The court may, in its discretion, exclude the pub-
lic from the hearing on this issue.
SECTION 4. It is the intent of the Legislature if this bill and Assembly
Bill 167 are both chaptered and become effective January 1, 1980, both bills
amend Section 4600 of the Civil Code, and this bill is chaptered after As-
sembly Bill 167, that the amendments to Section 4600 proposed by both
bills be given effect and incorporated in Section 4600 in the form set forth
in Section 3 of this act. Therefore, Section 3 of this act shall become oper-
ative only if this bill and Assembly Bill 167 are both chaptered and be-
come effective January 1, 1980, both amend Section 4600, and this bill is
chaptered after Assembly Bill 167, in which case Section 1 of this act shall
not become operative. 1979 Cal. Stat. 3479.
(Sections 2 and 3 went into effect).
44. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600(a) (West 1980).
45. Id. § 4600(b)(1).
46. Id. § 4600.5(b).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 4600.5(d).
49. Id. § 4600.5(g).
50. A bill now pending in the California Assembly, Assembly Bill 2202, was au-
thored by Assemblyman Imbrecht and attempts to define these terms.
51. In addition to AB 2202, another bill, AB 1706, introduced by Assemblyman
Lawrence Kapiloff, is pending. Its provisions would enact a first preference for
joint custody and would remove authority for split legal-physical joint custody
awards. This bill does not attempt to define the difference between those terms.
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III. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state
to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both par-
ents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage, and to
encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing
in order to effect this policy. 52
While it is clear that joint custody was the vehicle adopted by the
California Legislature to carry out this policy, it is doubtful that it
was meant to be exclusive.
Although the basic standard for determining who should be
awarded custody, "the best interests of the child," was left un-
changed, the major change in the law was that joint custody was
expressly authorized as an equal preference with custody award-
able to either parent. California Civil Code section 4600.5 also cre-
ates a presumption affecting the burden of proof that joint
custody is in the best interests of the child where the parents
agree to such an arrangement.5 3 This section clearly contem-
plates, however, that even when both parents agree, the court
may decline to enter a joint custody award, subject only to the re-
quirement that the court state its reasons for the denial.54 The
court also has authority to award joint custody even when both
parents do not agree.5 5 Although the statute contemplates such
an award, upon the motion of one parent its feasibility must be
carefully examined.
The presumption in favor of joint custody is overcome if the
parties agree, or the court determines that joint custody would
not be appropriate. In addition to the preference for joint custody
where both parents agree, the statute also provides that in deter-
mining who shall be awarded sole custody, the court must con-
sider "which parent is more likely to allow the child . . ..frequent
and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent.' '56
In a recent case, the California Supreme Court stated that in
awarding custody, the central question to be considered is which
parent will provide the child with ethical, emotional, and intellec-
tual guidance.
"The source of this guidance is the adult's own experience of life; its mo-
tive power is parental love and concern for the child's well being; and its
52. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4600(a) (West Supp. 1981).
53. Id. § 4600.5(a).
54. Id.
55. Id. §4600.5(b).
56. Id. § 4600.5(c).
teachings deal with such fundamental matters as the child's feelings
about himself, his relationships with others, his system of values, his stan-
dards of conduct, and his goals and priorities in life."
'5 7
Assuming that by encouraging an award of joint custody, the
legislature intended to protect the "best interests of the child"
and "to assure frequent and continuing contact of minor children
with both parents," it must now be examined whether these goals
can be met, and whether a presumption in favor of joint custody
is the most effective means to that end. The question squarely
posed by the wording of the legislative policy statement when
compared with the language of section 4600.5, is whether joint
custody as formulated by the statute adequately fulfills the policy
behind it.
In re Marriage of Neal5 8 considered an order for joint legal cus-
tody with physical custody awarded to the mother. The California
Court of Appeal held that the overlapping award was an abuse of
discretion but declined to reverse, saying that physical custody
gave the mother "'custody' which is real." This case highlights
the flaw of the statute caused by its failure to define the distinc-
tion between joint legal custody and joint physical custody.
Because there is no definition of these terms, and the statute
authorizes the court to make such overlapping awards, 59 Neal will
very likely control in future cases even though it was decided
prior to the effective date of AB 1480. Application of the Neal
holding would render the statute meaningless as a vehicle for car-
rying into effect its public policy statement, since the parent with
only joint legal custody would actually have no custody at all.
Later cases have apparently misconstrued the statute by as-
suming from the policy statement that joint custody has now
become the preferred award.60 Joint custody is but one of many
possible forms of child custody arrangements available to effectu-
ate the policy. Other situations, such as liberal visitation or al-
lowing free access between the child and the noncustodial parent,
could accomplish the intended result. The statute does not prefer
joint custody, but rather, only presumes joint custody to be in the
best interests of the child where the parents have so agreed.6 1
If the parents have not agreed to joint custody, or in cases
where for other reasons the court finds that joint custody is not in
57. In re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 739, 598 P.2d 36, 44, 157 Cal. Rptr.
383, 391 (1979).
58. In re Marriage of Neal, 92 Cal. App. 3d 834, 155 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1979).
59. CAL. Crv. CODE § 4600.5(c) (West Supp. 1981).
60. In re Marriage of Levin, 102 Cal. App. 3d 981, 162 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1980).
61. See In re Marriage of Murga, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 504, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 81
(1980) for an example of a correct application of the policy.
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the best interests of the child, the court may attempt to formulate
an order which will nevertheless assure the child of frequent and
continuing contact with the noncustodial parent. It should also be
noted that the policy statement does not raise the right in the
child to insist that a noncustodial parent maintain close contact or
any contact at all. 62 Thus, it appears that the legislature did not
intend to make joint custody a preference exclusive of other effec-
tive means to assure the proper application of public policy.
An effective joint custody arrangement makes tremendous de-
mands on parental capacity, measured by concern for the chil-
dren and the ability of the parents to interact with each other
concerning the manner in which children will be reared. To en-
sure the success of a joint custody order, two essential require-
ments must be fulfilled. The parents must have the ability to plan
for the welfare of the children, and they must be able to commu-
nicate and negotiate regarding solutions to unanticipated
problems. It is important to remember, however, that to effec-
tively accomplish the above, the parents must perform these
tasks objectively. Such objectivity necessitates that they be mini-
mally influenced by their personal conflicts and different atti-
tudes, values, or whatever other problems contributed to the
marital dissolution.
When one combines the normal human emotions which arise in
the context of the dissolution of a marriage with the demands
placed on parents by the stresses of everyday living, the burden
can be overwhelming. It may not be reasonable to assume that
presumptive joint custody will be appropriate in all, or even most
family situations. Is the present legislation based on an in-depth
analysis of the most effective means of parenting in a given situa-
tion, or did the legislature assume that since joint custody is the
ideal arrangement, it should therefore be state policy?
The bulk of public support for the joint custody presumption
has come from fathers' rights groups. Many feel that without it,
judges would follow precedent favoring women in custody awards
and both parties would ultimately be treated unfairly. Leading
advocates of the statutory presumption have enumerated its ben-
efits as reducing the imbalance between mothers and fathers in
custody suits, discouraging the use of custody battles as a means
62. Loudin v. Olpin, 118 Cal. App. 3d 565, 173 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1981).
of intimidation, and preventing fault-finding litigation. 63 However,
even if these arguments are valid, they tend to elevate parental
rights over those of the children, thus departing from the intent of
the legislature.
In reality, child custody is not simply a "legal" problem; it is a
human problem. Child custody is an interpersonal problem, a
psychological problem, and a child development problem. 64 The
role the court plays in the custody issue, has the nonlegal effect of
laying a foundation for a post-divorce family, affecting the ability
of its members to reorder their lives in such a way that the wel-
fare of the children is protected.
Studies have indicated that five years after the divorce the chil-
dren who were found to have adjusted more readily were those
who felt that the divorce had served a useful purpose (i.e., par-
ents were happier, there was less conflict, etc.), and those who
were able to retain continuity in their relationships with both par-
ents. 65 It was found that where parents and children participated
together in arriving at a custody arrangement, the parents were
more likely to abide by schedules, visitation arrangements and
obligations, than in situations where the court had imposed a cus-
tody arrangement.
In their study, Wallerstein and Kelly indicate that for twenty-
five percent of the families they studied, joint custody may be ap-
propriate. 66 They appear to identify one particular finding, how-
ever, to support joint custody as a suitable means of encouraging
post-divorce parent-child contact. "There is evidence in our find-
ings that lacking legal rights to share in decisions about major as-
pects of the children's lives ... many non-custodial parents
withdrew from their children in grief and frustration. Their with-
drawal was experienced by the children as a rejection and was
detrimental in its impact." 67 Wallerstein and Kelly's findings
demonstrate that the child's effective relationship with his or her
custodial parent (or parents) is essential to the child's successful
post-divorce development.
It has been suggested that if joint custody is feasible only in a
relatively small number of post divorce families, an alternate ap-
proach may be needed. Under the alternative approach, contact
63. Cook, Joint Custody, Sole Custody: A New Statute Reflects a New Perspec-
tive, 18 CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 31 (1980).
64. King, Child Custody-A Legal Problem?, 54 CAL ST. B. J. 156 (1979).
65. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAK-UP: How CHILDREN AND
PARENTS CAN COPE wrrH DIVORCE 215 (1980) (based on studies conducted since
1971 in the Children of Divorce Project at the Community Mental Health Center in
Marin County, California).
66. Id. at 310.
67. Id.
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should be encouraged between children and noncustodial par-
ents, and relationships within single parent households should be
enhanced to reduce the burdens that impair a custodial parent's
effectiveness.
A dual parenting approach is a possible suggestion, in which
one parent assumes the role of custodial parent, but traditional
"visitation rights" are replaced with "parenting responsibilities,"
thus emphasizing continued parent-child interaction on a mean-
ingful level and avoiding the "Disneyland Daddy or Mommie"
syndrome. 68 Wallerstein and Kelly have also recommended ex-
ploring alternate means of providing more sharing of child rearing
responsibilities and encouraging the noncustodial parent to re-
main active in his or her child's life.
In another recent study conducted to gather empirical evidence
regarding divorced fathers and how they perceived themselves as
either joint custody or visitation fathers, the results seemed to in-
dicate that joint custody fathers had a higher level of self-esteem
and often tended to be more involved with their children a year
after separation than did visitation fathers. Increased satisfaction
with the role he plays in the life of his child seems to increase the
quality of interaction with his. child making the father a more ef-
fective parent. More of the visitation fathers tended to have a low
sense of self worth as parents and tended to pull away from in-
volvement with their children. 69
The term "custody" encompasses all the tangible and intangible
qualities of a parent-child relationship.7 0 "Custody embraces the
sum of parental rights with respect to the rearing of a child, in-
cluding the care .... rights to the child's services and earnings
... and the right to direct his activities and make decisions re-
garding his care and control, education, health and religion."7 1
In recent years, the term "joint custody" has come to denote a
division of physical as well as shared legal custody.7 2 Whether or
not it is a viable option for divorced parents depends on the main-
tenance of a meaningful distinction between legal and physical
68. See, e.g., Bruch, Parenting At and After Divorce: A Search for New Models,
79 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1981).
69: D'Andrea, Joint Custody Fathers: Paternal Involvement and Paternal Self-
Esteem as related to Custody Matters (doctoral dissertation) (1981).
70. Comment, Joint Custody: An Alternative for Divorced Parents, 26 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1084, 1086 (1979).
71. Burge v. City of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 608, 617, 262 P.2d 6, 12 (1953).
72. Roman, The Disposable Parent, 15 CONCIUIAION CTS. REV. 1 (1977).
custody.73
By its definition, joint custody requires extensive parental coop-
eration.74 By perpetuating an attempt at joint custody between
embattled divorced parents, the arrangement can only serve to
engender more animosity between them.7 5 Has the legislature
contemplated the serious damage that may be inflicted upon chil-
dren drawn into an emotional maelstrom, involving parents who
do not have the capacity to parent cooperatively?
Can parents really isolate their marital conflicts from their roles
as parents? It has been suggested that joint custody eliminates
the need for, and likelihood of, power plays. With the power more
equally divided, the possibility of using the children as '"pawns"
decreases. 7 6
It has also been expressed that an incentive for parental coop-
eration may be created by an award of joint custody, in that a
breakdown of the arrangement will most likely result in a sole
custody decree in favor of the parent who did not precipitate the
failure. This leads one to question whether it really is in the best
interest of the child to place him in the position of "guinea pig,"
so to speak, in a situation where the failure of a cooperative
parenting arrangement has to be proved before it is modified. Is
the child placed in the very position that the joint custody pre-
sumption was designed to eliminate-that of a pawn in litigation?
By the time the matter is tried, the child will have suffered more
anxiety, trauma, and problems in addition to those inflicted upon
him by the initial divorce.
Divorce does not necessarily end relationships in families; it
changes them. Patterns of parental relationships following mari-
tal dissolution are undergoing a significant evolution. A new con-
cept is emerging that views post-divorce as a crisis event in the
life cycle, requiring a rearrangement of the interdependent rela-
tionships.77 A child's "best interest" is interdependent with, and
a product of, the "best interests" of all family members.78
The joint custody situation should be viewed, not in comparison
to an idealized intact family, but rather relative to the less ideal
alternatives of sole custody, litigation, and disposable parents.7 9
However, this is only valid in a situation where there are two par-
ents with apparent maturity, wisdom, and ability to put their own
73. See Comment, supra note 70, at 1086-90.
74. Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 647, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (1978).
75. See Comment, supra note 70, at 1106-20.
76. See Folberg & Graham, supra note 5, at 551.
77. Id. at 552.
78. Id. at 553.
79. Id. at 581.
[Vol. 9: 853, 1982] Joint Custody
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
feelings and prejudices aside. Unfortunately, this is a very diffi-
cult goal to achieve in an intact family situation, much less in a
divorced family.
A successful cooperative parenting arrangement requires the
acknowledgement that both parents assume appropriate responsi-
bility for the physical, emotional, and moral development of the
child. It requires shared rights and responsibilities for making
decisions that directly affect the child and provides an opportu-
nity for the child to live with each parent a substantial amount of
time. In determining whether joint custody is feasible in a given
situation, it is essential that the objectives of the parties involved
be determined. There is a need to explore the potential for
achieving these objectives through joint custody as well as alter-
native arrangements.8 0 The question then arises as to whether
the statutory presumption allows this type of analysis to take
place.
Benedek and Benedek have noted that since parents cannot be
prevented from implementing an informal joint custody arrange-
ment, it therefore makes sense to provide them with legal sanc-
tion and encouragement. 81 They suggest that joint custody
prevents the profound sense of loss that children often suffer in
divorce situations, and it preserves the advantages of involvement
with both parents (love, role models, etc.). Parents with joint cus-
tody tend not to experience the sense of loss and feelings of lone-
liness often experienced by a non-custodial parent, and the
burdens and expenses of child care are shared. Win/lose contests
and the role of fault in custody hearings are eliminated. In addi-
tion, the legal rights of both parents are recognized, thus provid-
ing psychological benefits to all parties involved. The need to rely
on sexual stereotyping is also eliminated.82
Those who oppose joint custody note that shuttling a child be-
tween parents invites the child's continual insecurity and instabil-
ity. Because of the possibility that one or both parents may
remarry or that the previously unemployed mother may obtain
employment outside the home, the problem of temporariness is
increased. If the parents separate geographically, the arrange-
ment may have to be revised. Another major objection is that ef-
80. Benedek & Benedek, Joint Custody: Solution or Illusion? 12 Am. J. PsYcm-
ATRY 1540 (1979).
81. Id. at 1543.
82. See Comment, supra note 70, at 1120-25.
fective decision making regarding the child will be a serious
problem unless there is complete cooperation.83
While the limited amount of research that has been done has
indicated that idealistically a joint custody arrangement can have
positive consequences for all involved, it seems apparent that the
main prerequisites for success in a joint custody arrangement is
parental cooperation, and not a legislative mandate.
A recent publication has stated:
[A] "small number of mavericks or radicals' in the legal and mental
health professions have been recommending joint custody as a means of
undoing the blanket lack of consideration for the rights of fathers often ev-
idenced by the courts. This has made joint custody into a pseudo-political
issue, and a rallying point for many angry and frustrated fathers who had
been unable, for whatever reason, to arrive at a satisfactory solution to
their marital conflict either legally or informally."
8 4
If this assertion is true, does statutorily mandated joint custody
preserve the rights of parents or children, and does it fulfill legis-
lative intent?
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the best circumstances, raising children calls for self-confidence,
patience, skill and the sense of when to leave well enough alone. During a
crisis period-like the transition process of divorce-the parents' emo-
tional state can blind them to their basic parenting work. Crisis or not,
parents are still parents .... 85
After divorce, each parent has the right to a new start as an in-
dependent individual. Each child has the right to a fulfilling and
continuing relationship with both parents. The best interests of
the child are dependent on the continuity and duration of the
joint custody arrangement, which in turn is partially dependent
on the continued satisfaction of the parents.
To provide this essential ingredient of continuity, in the context
of a joint custody arrangement, parents must have a cooperative
working relationship which allows them to make well-reasoned
decisions regarding the welfare of their children. They must both
have the desire to continue in an active involvement with the day
to day lives of their children, sharing the burdens along with the
delights of parenthood.
Parents should have a workable plan with objectives spelled
out, as to how the responsibilities will be shared. Ideally, it ap-
pears that the best situation would be to have parents work under
their own plan to achieve a cooperative parenting arrangement,
rather than to have a plan imposed by the court. The court's role
83. See Benedek, supra note 80, at 1541-42.
84. K. ROSENTHAL & H. KESHET, FATHERS WrrIHoUT PARTNERS 79 (1981).
85. I. Ricci, MOM'S HOUSE, DAD'S HOUSE 175 (1980).
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should be advisory, possibly through a conciliation court arrange-
ment, and should help parents arrange a satisfactory program
which could then be given approval by the court with resulting
enforceability.
The best illustration of this principle is the mediation and 'con-
ciliation services implemented through the "Sieroty Bill," Senate
Bill 961, requiring mediation in all contested custody and visita-
tion matters.86 The insertion of a conciliation or mediation pro-
cess preserves the family's right of self-determination, when
possible, and gives the families the skills required to conduct
their own "private ordering."87
In this system, the forum shifts from the trial court where deci-
sions are imposed to the family where the decisions are self-de-
termined with the help of a neutral third party. The advantage of
this system is that it removes the parental role from the divorce
process, provides a flexible, inexpensive forum for the resolution
of these disputes, models the skills required by the parties to re-
solve disputes in the future, rewards settlement, and focuses on
the future conduct of the parties, rather than on the negative con-
duct of the past. Separating the parental role from the divorce
that occurs in the spousal role helps to bring to a conclusion
those decisions which must be made by the court regarding prop-
erty and support, which take place in a relatively narrow span of
time.
The Los Angeles Conciliation Court has reached a written
agreement signed by the parties and has made an order of the
court in fifty-five to sixty percent of the matters referred. Los An-
geles has developed a marathon bargaining model which involves
86. Section 4607 of the California Civil Code was added, operative on January
1, 1981, and provides:
Section 4607(a) Where it appears on the face of the petition or other ap-
plication for an order or modification of an order for the custody or visita-
tion of a child or children that either or both such issues are contested, as
provided in Section 4600, 4600.1 or 4601, the matter shall be setkfor media-
tion of the contested issues prior to or concurrent with the setting of the
matter for hearing. The purpose of such mediation proceeding shall be to
reduce acrimony which may exist between the parties and to develop an
agreement assuring the child or children's close and continuing contact
with both parents after the marriage is dissolved. The mediator shall use
his or her best efforts to effect a settlement of the custody or visitation
dispute.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1981).
87. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
all members in the family in the dispute resolution process and
takes place over a period of three or four hours with additional
sessions scheduled, if necessary. During the process, the children
are interviewed first, and the parents are then interviewed, either
together, separately, or both. The final process includes drafting a
written agreement which is then signed by the parents, reviewed
by the attorneys, and made an enforceable order of the court by
the judge. This agreement can be modified at any time without
returning to court; however, terminating the agreement requires
an additional court hearing. The counselor is also available to the
family at any later date. If problems arise, additional conferences
are scheduled. Preliminary studies indicate these families are
one-third less likely to return to court as compared to those
whose disputes have been resolved through the adversary
process. 88
The joint custody and mandatory mediation legislation are com-
plementary, and both represent quantum changes: the former de-
fines a new status of parenting following divorce, while the latter
defines a new means by which this status is achieved and these
decisions are made. Both pieces of legislation favor the private
ordering of the parents and recognize that the divorce occurs in
the spousal role, not the parental role.
88. McIsaac, Mandatory Conciliation of Custody and Visitation Matters: Cali-
fornia's Bold Stroke, 19 CONCILATION CTS. REv. 73, 73 (1981).
